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Abstract
 
This year saw continued economic growth but increasing discontent over in-
equality and dispossession. Mindful of upcoming elections, Prime Minister
Hun Sen declared a “war on land-grabbing,” with little practical effect. Infight-
ing within the political opposition consolidated the government’s electoral
prospects, while the protests of the poor were forcibly suppressed.
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Cambodia’s state-society relations were influenced by
three factors in 2007: the booming economy, its effect on resource distribu-
tion, and the electoral cycle. These issues were significant in determining the
combination of cooptation and repression in government policy, and the popu-
lar response.
Cambodia’s economic boom moderated this year. The spectacular 13% gross
domestic product (GDP) growth of 2005 dropped to 10.4% in 2006 and is pre-
dicted to reach a respectable 9% for 2007. GDP growth continues to be driven
by garment manufacturing; garment exports increased by 20% in 2006, provid-
ing 334,000 new jobs. In 2007, expansion slowed because of increased com-
petition following Vietnam’s entry into the World Trade Organization. In 2008,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects that further erosion of gar-
ment exports will slow overall growth to less than 8%.
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agreement with Vietnam, the Cambodian government is pursuing the develop-
ment of Special Economic Zones on its borders with Vietnam and Thailand.
These zones take advantage of cheaper utilities across the border and award
investors tax breaks and special services to boost competitiveness and spread
the rewards of development beyond Phnom Penh and its environs.
Agricultural performance in Cambodia slowed more sharply. One report
suggests that the spectacular 13.4% growth in 2005 declined to only 4.4% in
2006, on a par with the 3.4% a year achieved on average between 1994 and
2004.
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 The 2005 figures may have been largely because of unusually good
weather. Rice production, accounting for 88% of crops harvested, remains
erratic and is subject to drought and flooding, with only 7% of arable land irri-
gated, the lowest rate in Southeast Asia. Poor performance in agriculture affects
the 70% of the expanding work force who depend upon this sector: poverty is
concentrated among rural farmers. The government has proclaimed irrigation
expansion a priority, but at present, agriculture is the Cambodian economy’s
poor relation.
The rosy picture thus hides some significant problems for the Cambodian
government as it heads into elections in 2008. The benefits of economic growth
have been disproportionately urban, aiding the rich at the expense of the poor.
In part this is directly due to cronyism within government. The Phnom Penh
Municipality, for example, in 2007 sold the city’s Boeung Kak Lake area for
redevelopment to a Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) senator for the discount
price of US$79 million, or $0.6 per square meter. This was a favorable deal in
a town where prime real estate sells for $700–$1,000 per square meter.
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 The
redevelopment of Boeung Kak will displace 4,250 families.
This forthcoming eviction is one of many, and contention between develop-
ers and the dispossessed has been widespread. The year saw protests in Phnom
Penh by farmers from Koh Kong Province whose orchards had been bulldozed
to make way for sugar plantations owned by another CPP senator, and a land-
grabbing lawsuit by indigenous Jarai people against the sister of Finance Min-
ister Keat Chhon. In Poipet, 466 families were turned off their land; 300 more
were forced out of squatter homes in the Angkor Park in Siem Reap, where
they had lived for a decade; 100 families were evicted from the Tonle Bassac
area of Phnom Penh; and tons of rubble were dumped on family homes lying
in the way of port expansion in Sihanoukville.
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This kind of eviction has become a feature of Cambodia’s development over
the past decade. Official title to land is difficult and expensive to come by: 80%
of rural households with land have no secure title and are easily displaced.
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Courts and local authorities who can award title or adjudicate land disputes re-
main highly politicized and corrupt—a situation the government has failed to
remedy. Combined with frequent distress sales, associated with food insecu-
rity and high health care costs, the pattern of land ownership has been trans-
formed since the socialist era ended in 1989. A relatively egalitarian distribution
in 1989 has given way to sharp inequality: the top 10% now own 64% of the land
and the top 1% own an estimated 20%–30%.
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 Twenty percent of the rural pop-
ulation is now landless, a rate that increases by two percentage points per year.
 
6
Resource Issues
 
In 2007, the Cambodian government responded halfheartedly to public dis-
content. A draft sub-decree on evictions was produced, raising hopes that the
violence associated with evictions would end but also fears that squatters’
rights would be further eroded. Squatters’ rights campaigners noted that the
sub-decree in effect legalized forced evictions. Although it mentions compen-
sation, it includes no clear rules for determining what is fair.
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 Mindful of forth-
coming elections, Prime Minister Hun Sen made speeches this year threatening
to rein in “land-grabbers” and raised the specter of a farmers’ revolution if
abuses continue. However, the only action taken so far has been the arrest and
prosecution of individuals associated with the prime minister’s long-time CPP
rival, Chea Sim.
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Forest resources are the subject of similar concern. In 2007 the international
nongovernmental organization (NGO) Global Witness produced a report at-
tributing the destruction of 29% of Cambodia’s forest cover in five years to a
“kleptocratic elite.” The report documented the apparently tight connections
between the owners and exploiters of Cambodia’s land and forest resources
and the family of Hun Sen.
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 The report, controversially, was banned by the
Cambodian government in July.
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In this ongoing redistribution of resources from the poor to the rich, Cam-
bodian tycoons linked to the ruling party are well placed to cash in. Domestic
investment outstripped foreign investment for the first time in 2007, in a cli-
mate that is increasingly lucrative and predictable for those with connections.
As Hun Sen has consolidated his dominant position, the turf wars among dif-
ferent patronage networks, which caused sudden and unpredictable shifts in
government activity in the past, have largely ceased. Today, government pro-
cesses still work through personal and unofficial channels but these processes
are better institutionalized and offer an effective service to the well-connected,
significantly reducing investment risk.
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 Indeed, the award of monopolies to
favored companies, such as the four-year monopoly on the lucrative football
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gambling business awarded to Cambo Six this year, virtually guarantees gen-
erous profits. In September, to facilitate the expansion of Cambodian compa-
nies, the government announced a plan to open a securities exchange in 2009.
Within a week of the announcement, legislators passed a securities law—a
flurry of activity unmatched with respect to other long-awaited legislation, no-
tably the anti-corruption law, which is entering its twelfth year in the drafting
process.
Cambodia’s main source of foreign investment this year was the People’s
Republic of China, which is also its largest aid donor. The close relations be-
tween Cambodia and China have caused concern among Western donors over
the erosion of donor leverage in pursuit of governance reform. Chinese com-
panies are preparing to build three hydroelectric power stations in Cambodia
and are in the bidding for rights to explore Cambodian offshore oil reserves.
 
The Future of Oil
 
Predictions that Cambodia can expect to receive revenues from oil drilling of
$170 million a year by 2011 and $1.7 billion a year by 2021 have intensified
concerns over the future trajectory of governance.
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 At their peak, revenues from
oil alone will be worth three times current international aid receipts. Concerns
about a “resource curse” appear justified, as mechanisms put in place so far
for managing oil wealth suggest business as usual. The Cambodia National
Petroleum Authority (CPNA), responsible for the petroleum industry, has been
shifted from the Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Energy to the direct control
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of powerful Deputy Prime Minister Sok An, ostensibly to simplify the con-
tracting process.
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 Previous research into successful aid projects in Cambodia,
however, suggests that the most efficiently managed operations are those that
are insulated from political actors and given a high degree of decision-making
autonomy.
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 The CPNA has been secretive about its dealings with oil compa-
nies so far: one Canadian oil firm reportedly withdrew from the bidding pro-
cess, claiming that bribes were solicited for permits that never materialized.
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The Cambodian government appears set to use oil as it used forests, as a re-
source to generate political slush funds that reward regime supporters.
In the electoral arena, this strategy has worked well for a decade now. This
year saw voters passing judgment on the commune chiefs and councils they
first elected back in 2002. The CPP swept the board with 61% of the popular
vote and wins in 98.2% of communes, a result little changed from 2002. Gov-
ernment spokesman Khieu Kanharith attributed the CPP win to the fact that
the party had “spent at least one million riel [$250] in each commune on de-
velopment projects.”
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 Combined with threats of withdrawal of government pro-
tection and dispossession of land, regularly reported by opposition supporters,
the strategy of ameliorating discontent with a school- and road-building pro-
gram appears to have been effective in winning votes.
However, electoral turnout dropped markedly, from 87.5% in 2002 to 65.4%
in 2007, prompting opposition claims that their supporters were excluded from
voting and will be excluded again in national elections in 2008. Among the
opposition parties, the commune election results also revealed the impact of a
year of royalist infighting. The CPP’s longstanding royalist coalition partner,
FUNCINPEC (a French acronym for the National United Front for an Inde-
pendent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia) fell apart following
the 2006 ouster of its former leader, Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Ranariddh
became the target of a lawsuit by FUNCINPEC Senator Nhiek Bun Chhay,
who accused the prince of corruption in the 2006 sale of the front’s Phnom
Penh headquarters. Ranariddh was found guilty in March 2007 of breach of
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trust and sentenced to 18 months in jail. The affair kept him out of Cambodia,
unable to campaign for his new Norodom Ranariddh Party, in the commune
elections. Wrangling between Ranariddh and FUNCINPEC was public and
bitter all year, reducing the chances of a strong royalist showing in the 2008
national elections.
The other main opposition party, the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), consequently
emerged as the only serious opposition contender, with a quarter of the pop-
ular vote. Yet, it too has its problems. In 2006, in the face of threats of im-
prisonment against its leader Sam Rainsy, the party accepted a constitutional
amendment lowering the threshold of parliamentary seats required to form a
government from 66% to 50%. Since then, the party has been uncharacteris-
tically quiet. Relations between the SRP and the CPP have improved, allow-
ing the former to function; however, human rights activists complained this
year that as a result the party had been less effective in performing its role as a
watchdog and champion of the poor. The SRP may be calculating that the col-
lapse of the royalists could consolidate the opposition vote, delivering power
to the SRP in 2008 elections. It is difficult to see the CPP permitting this out-
come, and the launch of a new Human Rights Party by prominent opposition
figure Kem Sokha may split the opposition again, leaving the CPP to rule alone
or in coalition.
The current quiescence of the opposition raises the question of whether the
CPP has become too powerful for its own good. Without an activist political
opposition in an environment of sharply decreasing tolerance for public pro-
test, there are now few outlets for the discontented to vent their frustrations in
Cambodian politics. Civil society continues to be sharply circumscribed; the
labor movement lost another leader this year with the contract-style killing of
a Free Trade Union leader, Hy Vuthy. Cambodian trade unions did not hold
their customary May Day Parade following violent confrontations with the po-
lice in 2006. In June 2007, the government banned protests by Buddhist monks
following a series of demonstrations outside the Vietnamese Embassy over the
treatment of ethnic Khmer monks in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta. Signs of social
alienation have been widely documented in rising rates of drug addiction and
youth gang membership.
The CPP in 2007 appears more powerful than ever, with large flows of cash
at its disposal from China, oil companies, and Cambodian entrepreneurs as well
as from Western donors. However, the party presides over a society in which
inequality, landlessness, and alienation are rising. The government’s response
has been a combination of cooptation and the mobilization of a menacing po-
litical climate of suppression. This has been effective so far and will doubtless
deliver a further election victory in 2008. In the long run, however, it is diffi-
cult to see how stability can be sustained unless action is taken to rein in abuse
and sharply improve the plight of the poor.
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